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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
DONALD BUCKNER,

Respondent,
vs.
MAIN REALTY AND INSURANCE
COMPANY, a Corporation, and
ROBERT STEVENSON,

I
' Case No. 8345

1

)

Appellants.

BRIEF ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are simple and without dispute, and for the
purpose of clarity we shall refer to the parties as they were
below.
On the 22nd day of September, 1954, Plaintiff filed an
action against the Defendants in this cause in the City Court
of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 18).
The Defendant, Robert Stevenson, was served with Summons
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in this matter personally (R. 17), and Defendant, Main Realty
& Insurance Company, erroneously denominated a Corporation
by the Plaintiff, was purportedly served with Summons by a
copy of the Summons being delivered and left with one, Jean
Thompson, who according to the Sheriff's Return (R. 16) was
"their Secretary of Company." On the 29th day of November,
1954 the Court entered the Default of both Defendants (R.
14) . Judgment by Default was taken against them in the sum
of $150.00 plus $5.20 costs (R. 13). Thereafter on the 1st
day of February, 1955, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal
in the City Court appealing the Judgment taken by the Plaintiff
to the District Court (R. 12). In connection therewith, Defendants also filed a Motion to recall and Dismiss the Execution
and Attachment theretofore levied by the Plaintiff, pending
disposition of the cause on Appeal (R. 11), and in support
thereof filed a corporate stay bond. Defendants Motion was
noticed for hearing on February 7, 1955 (R. 10) and the Court
having heard the arguments of Counsel ordered the execution
and attachment recalled and dismissed pending the disposition
of the case on appeal (R. 11). Defendants thereupon filed
their Answer and Counterclaim in the District Court of the
Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County to the
Complaint of the Plaintiff formerly filed in the City Court
(R. 2, 3 and 4) but now filed in the District Court. Thereupon
Plaintiff filed his Motion to Strike Defendants' Answer and
Counterclaim (R. 7) and a Motion to Dismiss Defendants'
Appeal (R. 6). Arguments were presented by Counsel and
on the lOth day of March, 1955, the Court granted Plaintiff's
Motion to Dismiss Defendants' Appeal (R. 1).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. .That the Trial Court erred in granting Plaintiff's Order
Dismissing Appeal.

ARGUMENT
The record is clear that more than twenty ( 20) days
elapsed from the time of the service of Summons in this case
and that thereafter the City Court entered its Judgment in
favor of the Plaintiff. The record is equally clear, however,
and there is no dispute on this point, that the Plaintiff at no
time in this case served upon the Defendants, or either of them,
a Notice of the entry of the Judgment in the City Court. The
crux of this case is whether such a notice is necessary under
the law to toll the right of appeal to the District Court. The
City Court held that it was in finding in favor of the defendants
and the District Court held it was not in finding in favor of
the Plaintiff.
In this connection, Defendants invite the attention of
the Court to the provisions of Rule 73 (h) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure which provides, in part, as follows:
"(h) Appeal from a judgment rendered in a City or
Justice Court.-An appeal may be taken to the District
Court from a final judgment rendered in a City or Justice
Court within one month after notice of the entry of such
Judgment or within such shorter time as may be provided
by law." (Emphasis added.)
It has always seemed abundantly clear to this writer that
the language of this rule is clear, concise and unambiguous
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and that under it, appeal time runs on any final judgment
entered in a City Court from the date of the notice of entry
of such judgment.
The Plaintiff, in the prior arguments of this case, has
always insisted that other rules found elsewhere in the Civil
Rules of Procedure which provide that notices generally need
not be given to a party in default are to be superimposed upon
Rule 73 (h) in order to make that rule provide that an appeal
may be taken to the District Court from a final judgment rendered in a City Court within one month after notice of the
entry of such judgment to all paries not in default. The Court
below adopted this position.

It is respectfully submitted by Defendants that such reasoning is erroneous for the following reasons:
FIRST: The rules upon which the Plaintiff has relied are
clearly and specifically stated to be rules applicable to the
District Courts. It is true that under Rule 81 (c) these rules
apply to civil actions in City Courts except in so far as such
rules are by their nature clearly inapplicabe to such Courts or
proceedings therein. Nothing coud be clearer, however, in the
matter of the necessity of the notice of the entry of judgment
than a specific provision such as Rule 73 (h) which clearly
and unequivocally sets forth the procedure as. to the taking
of an appeal from the City Court to the District Court. The
language is plain and unambiguous. No distinction is attempted
between judgments entered by default or judgments entered
at the conclusion of the trial of the particular case. This Court
in promulgating this particular rule has simply and clearly
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provided that one may appeal to the District Court from a
final judgment within one month after the notice of entry of
such judgment.
SECOND: The reasoning of the Court below is erroneous
when the Court properly considers the historical aspect of
the promulgation of Rule 73• (h). It will be remembered that
the procedure for appeal from a City or Justice Court prior
to the promulgation of the new Rules of Civil Procedure was
crystal clear in requiring the prevailing party in any judgment
rendered in the City or Justice Court to serve upon the adverse
party a notice of the entry of the judgment in such proceedings
in order to toll the time within which an appeal might be taken.
This rule in the City Courts had therefore been established
by long practice. When the new Rules of Civil Procedure were
promulgated by this Court on the 1st day of January, 1950,
Rule 73 (h) was not one of the original rules. On the 3rd
day of December, 1951, this Court adopted certain amendments
to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to have an effective date
January 1, 1952, which amendments had been prepared by
the Committee on preparation of Rules pursuant to the
direction of the Supreme Court. Among the various amendments made were Rules 73 (h) through ( m). Herein the Court
adopted a set of rules which it specifically applied to the
method and means by which appeals should be taken from
City or Justice Courts to the various District Courts. It is submitted that it was the intention of the Court in adopting these
amendments herein referred to to restablish the method of
taking an appeal to the District Court from a City Court as it
had been formerly established under the Statutes and Rules
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of Courts existing prior to the adoption of the new Rules of
Civil Procedure. Had this Court intended to change the former
rule, it could have done so very easily by specifically providing
that a notice of entry of judgment should be required in all
cases except those involving a default judgment. No such
limitation was made in the Rule, and it is submitted that none
was intended; but rather that this Court did intend specifically
to reinact the former Rule which had been one of long standing
and wide practice to remain the rule in so far as appeals from
City Courts were concerned.
One might speculate as to why, in the original instance,
notice of the entry of judgment was required in order to toll
the time for taking an Appeal in the City Courts when such a
rule was not required in the District Courts. Perhaps no satisfactory answer can be given to such a query. It would seem
to this writer, however, that if a valid reason did and does
now exist for the requirement of the giving of the notice of
the entry of judgment, the reason is much more persuasive in
cases in volving a default where a meritorious claim may exist
in favor of the Defendant than in a case which has been tried
to the Court and decided at the conclusion of the trial. Certainly one who is in default is much less likely to know of the
action which has been taken by the Court than one who has
been present personally or by and through his Counsel during
the course of the trial and has heard the Judge announce his
decision.
'fHIRD: To adopt the rule as the Court below has done
1s to violate the \vell settled rules of noscitur a sociis and
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ejusdem generis. Where one or more of the rules of civil
procedure announce general statements of procedure but where
other rules are specific and make particular application to
specific phases of procedure, the specific will control the general. Under these rules of construction, Rule 73 (h) is a
specific rule having particular application to the precise procedure to be followed in taking appeals from City or Justice
Courts and shall control other general rules which at no time
specifically mention anything concerning city court appeals
and the requirement of notices of entry of judgment.
We desire to call to the attention of the Court the fact
that the appeal from the City Court to the Disrict Court was
not taken for a frivolous purpose or for the purpose of delay.
The Answer and Counterclaim filed herein puts in issue valuable rights centered around specific performance of an alleged
Contract for the sale of real property. This mention is made
only to indicate that the appeal was not one which is sometimes
taken for what might be termed ''other than legitimate reasons.''

CONCLUSION
Appellants earnestly submit that the granting of Plaintiff's Order Dismissing Defendants' Appeal entered in the
Court below and from which this Appeal is taken is contrary
to the law and the rules of civil procedure adopted by this
Court governing the procedure for taking an appeal from the
City of Justice Court to the District Court.
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WHEREFORE, Appellants pray that the Order of the
Court below appealed from be reversed and that the cause
be remanded with instructions to the Court below to vacate
said Order.
Respectfully submttted,
LOWRY, KIRTON & BETTILYON
Wilford W. Kirton, Jr.
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